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THE DEMURRER-AT COMMON LAW, UNDER
MODERN CODES, PRACTICE ACTS, AND
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE*
PART II
ALISON REPPY

IX. THE STATUTES OF ELIZABETH AND ANNE
IN AMERICA
As LONG as the American Colonies remained subject to the British Crown, it is presumed that the Statute of 27 Elizabeth, c. 5, § 1
(1585), and the amending Statute of 4 Anne, c. 16, § 1 (1705), were
binding upon the colonists. But when, in 1776, the Colonial Period ended and Provincial Period began, it was inevitable that the former colonies should be organized into states. And, in response to just such a
suggestion from the Continental Congress, the colonies soon began organizing as States. New York became a full-fledged state under the
Constitution of 1777, and on February 20, 1796, the State Legislature enacted the first statute governing Demurrers, which incorporated
first, the first part of the Statute of Elizabeth; second, a portion of
the Statute of Anne; and third, it ended with the final lines from the
Statute of Elizabeth. For the purpose of showing the derivation of
each portion of the New York Statute of Demurrers, that part of the
Statute of Elizabeth will be printed in Roman type, whereas that
part taken from the Statute of Anne will be in italics. The New York
Statute appears below:
THE NEW YORK STATUTE OF DEMURRERS (1788)
(2 Laws of the State of New York, c. XXII, § 7)
VII. And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That
where any demurrer hath been, or shall be joined and entered in any
action or suit in any court of record in this state, the judges or justices shall proceed and give judgment, according as the very right of
the cause and matter in law shall appear unto them, without regarding any imperfection, omission, defect or want of form, in any writ,
return, plaint, declaration, or other pleading, process, or course of proceeding whatsoever, except those only which the party demurring shall
specially and particularly set down and express, together with his
demurrer, as causes of the same, notwithstanding that such imperfection, omission or defect might have heretofore been taken to be matAmsox REPY is Dean and Professor of Law at New York Law School.
* This is a continuation from page 27 of an article begun in the January issue of
the NEw YoRx LAW FORU'r.
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.so as sufficient matter appear in the pleadter of substance.....
ings, upon which the court may give judgment according to the very
right of the cause; and therefore ..... .no advantage or exception
shall be taken of, or for an immaterial traverse, or of or for the default of entering pledges upon any bill or declaration,or of or for the
default of alledging the bringing into court any bond, bill, indenture, or other deed whafsoever, mentioned in the declarationor other
pleading, or of or for the default of alledging the bringing into court
letters testamentary, or letters of administration, or of or for the
omission of the words, with force and arms, or, against the peace, or
either of them; or of or for want of the averment for words, and this
he is ready to verify, or, and this he is ready to verify by the records;
or of or 'for not alledging, as appears by the record; but the court
shall give judgment according to the very right of the cause as aforesaid, without regarding any such imperfections, omissions or defects,
or any other matter of like nature, except the same shall be specially
and particularlyset down and shewn for cause of demurrer, and that
no judgment shall be reversed by any writ of error for any such imperfection, omission, defect or .want of form as is aforesaid, except
such only as are before excepted.
After the adoption of the Constitution and the establishment of
the Federal Government, it is interesting to observe that almost immediately, that is, in the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress enacted the
Federal Statute of Demurrers, as represented by Section 32 of that
act. This Statute came one year later than the New York Statute of
Demurrers, but unlike that statute, which was a combination of the
provisions of the Statutes of Elizabeth and Anne, the Federal Statute
was in the main taken from the Statute of Elizabeth. This fact will
appear clearly from the italicized language of the Statute, as set out
below:
THE FEDERAL STATUTE OF DEMURRERS (1789)
(1 United States Statutes at Large, c. 20, § 32)
Sec. 32. And be it further enacted, That no summons, writ,
declaration, return, process, judgment, or other proceedings in civil
causes in any of the courts of the United States, shall be abated, arrested, quashed or reversed, for any defect or want of form, but the
said courts respectively shall proceed and give judgment according as
the right of the cause and matter in law shall appear unto them, without regardingany imperfections, defects, or want of form in such writ,
declaration,or other pleading, return, process, judgment, or course of
proceeding whatsoever, except those only in cases of demurrer, which
the party demurring shall specially sit down and express together
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with his demurrer as the cause thereof. And the said courts respectively shall and may, by virtue of this act, from time to time, amend
all and every such imperfections, defects and wants of form, other
than those only which the party demurring shall express as aforesaid,
and may at any time permit either of the parties to amend any defect
in the process or pleadings, upon such conditions as the said courts
respectively shall in their discretion, and by their rules prescribe.
X.

DEFECTS AVAILABLE UPON GENERAL OR SPECIAL
DEMURRER

(A) The General Rules as to Defects Available Upon a General
DemurrerAfter the Statute of Elizabeth (1585) andthe Statute of Anne
(1705).-After the amendment of the Statute of Elizabeth (1585)
by the Statute of Anne (1705), the general rule was that upon a General Demurrer any substantive defect was available. 9
Other defects available upon General Demurrer include a misjoinder of a contract and a tort cause of action in the same declaration;""
misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties plaintiff or defendant, if the defect is apparent on the face of the pleading; 91 a variance; 92 or allegations in the disjunctive3 Ordinarily the Statute of Limitations is
not available on Demurrer as the general rule is that it is no part of
89 The early English case on this point is Walden v. Holman, 2 Ld. Raym. 101,
92 Eng. Rep. 175 (1703).
90 Gilmore et al. v. Christ Hospital & Dickinson, 68 N. J. L. 47, 52 Atl. 241
(1902).
91 Burgess v. Abbot & Ely, 1 Hill (N. Y.) 476 (1841).
On the misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties in New York, see the New York
Civil Practice Act, § 192, which provides: "No action or special proceeding shall be
defeated by the nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties except as provided in section one
hundred ninety-three. New parties may be added or substituted and parties misjoined may be dropped by order of the court at any stage of the cause as justice may
require."
See, also, Rule 102, New York Rules of Civil Practice, which provides: "If any
matter contained in a pleading be so indefinite, uncertain or obscure that the precise
meaning or application thereof is not apparent, or if there be a misjoinder of parties
plaintiff, or a defect of parties plaintiff or defendant, the court may order the party to
serve such amended pleading as the nature of the case may require."
92 Maryland: Osborne v. Fulton, 1 Blackf. (Md.) 233 (1822); Federal: Cook v.
Graham's Adm'r, 3 Cranch (U. S.) 220, 2 L. Ed. 420 (1805).
The common-law rule as to variance has been modified by the Codes and Practice Acts. Thus, for example, in New Jersey, if a variance does not mislead the opposite party to his prejudice, the court may order an immediate amendment to avoid
such a variance; if it might mislead, then amendment will only be allowed on terms.
(N. J. P. L.'s, 1903, p. 571). For a provision similar in scope, see New York Civil
Practice Rule 166.
93 McCurda v. Lewistown Journal Company, 104 Me. 554, 72 AtI. 490 (1908).
Cf. The New Jersey Supreme Court Rule 37, which provides: "Plaintiff may claim
alternative relief based upon an alternative construction or ascertainment of his cause
of action."
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the plaintiff's case to show that his action is not barred by the statute.
Such a showing may be essential where the period of limitation is
treated as a part of the right created by the statute. If, in the absence of a statute, a declaration or complaint discloses on its face
that the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations, there is a
conflict of opinion, the general tendency of which is against the availability of the defect on Demurrer 4 The situation with respect to
whether the Statute of Frauds is available on Demurrer raises substantially the same problem as the Statute of Limitations. At common law the rule was that where an action was founded upon a contract which at common law was valid without a writing, but which the
statute required to be in writing, it was necessary for the declaration
to count upon or take notice of the writing. 95 If, however, the contract was not valid without a writing, and the plaintiff failed to allege
it, there appears to be a conflict in the decisions as to whether the defect is available on Demurrer. 6
(B) Exception to the GeneralRule as to Defects Available Upon
a General Demurrer.-While the general rule is that upon a General
Demurrer only defects in substance are available, there is an exception to the rule where the plaintiff files a General Demurrer to a plea
in abatement defective in form.97 Thus, in Humphrey v. Whitten,9"
94 Buldey v. Norwich & Westerly Ry. Co., 81 Conn. 284, 72 At!. 1021 (1908).
Cf. Kirkpatrick v. Monroe, 234 Ill.App. 213 (1924), reviewed critically in 20 Ill.
L. Rev. 391 (1925).
For a New York case holding that the defect can be reached, see Sharron v.
Inland Lines, 214 N. Y. 101, 108 N. E. 1192 (1915).
For an excellent discussion of the cases on this point specifically and on the defense
of the statute of limitations in general; see the articles by Atkinson, Pleading the Statute of Limitations, 36 YALE L. J. 914, 918-926 (1927); Atkinson, Some Procedural
Aspects of the Statute of Limitations, 27 COL. L. REV. 157 (1927); Atkinson, Allegations of Time in Pleading, 35 YALE L. J. 487 (1926).
As to whether the Statute of Frauds is available on Demurrer, see Gibson v.
Crawford, 247 Ky. 228, 56 S. W. 2d 985 (1932), noted in 22 Ky. L. J. 448 (1934).
Cf. 25 COL. L. REv. 844 (1925); 69 U. or PA. L. REV. 279 (1921); 36 YALE L. 3. 1188
(1927).
For a thorough discussion of the problem under the Codes, with full citation
of cases, see CLARK, HANDBOOK or THE LAW or CODE PLEADING, C. 8, § 82, 522-523
(2d ed. St. Paul 1947).
95 Whitehead v. Burgess, 61 N. J. L. 75, 38 At!. 802 (1897).
96 Gibson v. Crawford, 247 Ky. 228, 56 S. W. 2d 985 (1932), reviewed in 22 KY.
L. J. 448 (1934). Cf. 25 COL. L. REV. 844 (1925). And see, also, Note: Torts-Forcible Recaption of Chattels from Land of Another, 36 YALE L. J. 1188 (1927).
97 Ryan v. May, 14 Ill.
49 (1852), in which CAToNr, J., declared: "Unlike other
pleas, a plea in abatement does not profess to answer the declaration, or defeat the
cause of action. It goes only to the writ. It would be inconsistent with all sound rules
of pleading to carry a demurrer to one pleading [a plea in abatement] back to another,
to which it did not profess to be an answer, and with which it had no connection."
98 17 Ala. 30 (1849); Shaw v. Dutcher, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) *216, 215 at *222, 221
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where the plaintiff brought trover against the defendant in the name
of James Humphreys, the defendant pleaded that he was and always
has been known by the name of James Humphrey, and not James
Humphreys, as by the plaintiff's writ supposed, to which plea, sworn
to by the defendant, the plaintiff Demurred generally, on the ground
that the plea was defective in form in not concluding with new matter,
as the plea contained new matter, thus raising an issue of law as to
whether a defect in form in a plea in abatement could be reached by
a General Demurrer after the Statute of Elizabeth and the Statute of
Anne, the latter of which rendered it unnecessary to Demur specially
for want of the averment or verification in question. But these statutes did not extend to pleas in abatement, hence the court was still
confronted with the question whether the defect in form in the defendant's plea in abatement was available on General Demurrer, when
the general rule, after 1585, was that you had to Demur specially in
order to reach a defect in form. The court held that the General Demurrer reached the defect in form-the failure to allege a verification
-in the plea in abatement. Why? Because, at common law, prior
to the statute, a General Demurrer reached both defects in form and
defects in substance in a pleading to which it was interposed, and
since the Statute of Elizabeth and the Statute of Anne only applied
to pleas in bar-the judges only being required to give judgment on
the merits-the original common law as to the scope of a General Demurrer to a plea in abatement was not changed, and therefore, as a
General Demurrer reached a defect in form in a plea in abatement before 1585, it still reached it after 1585, the common-law rule not having been disturbed. Thus, came into existence the exception to the
general rule that in order to reach a defect in form in a pleading after
the Statutes of Jeofails, you must Demur specially. 9
(C) The General Rules as to Defects Available Upon a Special
Demurrer After the Statute of Elizabeth (1585) and the Statute of
(1838), in which Cowrsr, J., declared: "Testing the plea below by these rules, it is
fatally defective. It begins and concludes by praying judgment of the said bill. I
incline to think that this was a defect of substance; but if of form only, being in
abatement, the defect need not be assigned specially. Such is the construction of the
English statutes of special demurrers, (27 Eliz., c. 5, § 1, & 4 Anne c. 16, § 1), and
ours is but an epitome of those acts. (2 R. S. 276, 2d ed.). The English authorities to
this point will be found in 1 Chit. Pl. 404; Walden v. Holman, 2 Ld. Raym. 1015;
per BAYLEY, J., in Lloyd v. Williams, 2 Maule & Selw. 484, 5. Walden v. Holman,
is in point."
But compare Note, Pleading-Plea in Abatement-Code, 18 MIcH. L. REv. 433

(1920).
99 See Heard v. Baskerville, Hob. 233, 80 Eng. Rep. 378 (1614).
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Anne (1705).-The genera] rule was that upon a Special Demurrer
any defect in form as created by a violation of a rule of pleading
as to the manner and form in which a substantive allegation should
be averred was available, if the cause of Demurrer was specifically
assigned. Thus, for example, uncertainty of allegation, improper
ending of a plea, joinder of several causes of action in a single count,
or any other violation of a rule of pleading, constitutes a defect in
form.
(D) The Defect of Duplicity.-Prior to the Statute of Elizabeth (1585) the defect of duplicity (which was neither a formal nor
a substantive defect), was, as a matter of precedent in pleading, only
available upon a Special Demurrer. In fact, the Special Demurrer was
seldom used for any other purpose, as an ordinary defect in form was
available on General Demurrer, without any assignment of cause. After
the statute, duplicity, despite its peculiarity as a fault, was treated as
0 But
a formal defect, and hence available upon a Special Demurrer. 1°
in Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Bates Expanded Steel Truss
Co.,' 01 where the defendant Demurred to the first and second counts
of an amended declaration in Case on the ground of duplicity, the
court regarding the rules of pleading as but juridical instrumentalities for the, furtherance of justice, and applying the code rule of liberal construction, overruled the Demurrer, where at common law the
Demurrer would have been sustained. And in England, under the influence of the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852, which provided
that "no pleading shall be deemed insufficient for any defect which
could heretofore only be objected to by Special Demurrer,' 0 2 duplicity, along with other formal defects, ceased to be available on De10 3
murrer. The remedy is now by motion.
2o0 Handy v. Chatfield, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 35 (1840).
101 11 F. 2d 415 (1926).
102 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, § 51.
103 In Curtis Funeral Home v. Smith Lumber Co., 114 Vt. 150, 152, 40 A. 2d
531, 532 (1945), MOULTON, C. J., declared: "Duplicity is a defect of form and not of
substance. Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481, 489, 1 A. 2d 817.
At common law this fault in a declaration could be reached only by a Special Demurrer, Lewis v. John Crane & Sons, 78 Vt. 216, 220, 62 Ad. 60; 1 Cbitty, Pleading,
16th Am. ed. 252; Gould, Pleading, 4th ed. 430, n. 1. But under our Practice Act,
which provides, P. L. 1578, that a pleading shall not fail for want of form and that
the sufficiency of all pleadings in this respect is for the discretionary determination of
the trial court, the function of a Demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a pleading in
matters of substance only. Coburn v. Village of Swanton, 95 Vt. 320, 324, 325, 115 A.
153. The modem Demurrer resembles the former Special Demurrer merely in that the
Act, P. L. 1574, m, requires it distinctly to specify the reason why the pleading Demurred to is insufficient. Coates v. Eastern States Farmers Exchange, 99 Vt. 170,
177, 130 A. 709. It follows that, in our practice, Special Demurrers as known in the
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(E) Degree of Particularity Required Upon a Special Demurrer.-With respect to the degree of particularity with which,
under the Statutes of Elizabeth and Anne, the Special Demurrer must
assign the ground of Demurrer, it may be observed that it is not sufficient to object in general terms that the pleading is "uncertain, defective, informal," or the like, but it is necessary to show in what
respect it is uncertain, defective or informal. Thus, for example, in
the early New York case of Snyder, Van Vechten & Bradt, Executors of Bradt v. Croy,'0 A, the plaintiff, brought an action of trespass for killing a mare, to which B, the defendant, pleaded former
recovery. To this plea, A replied denying the former recovery was for
the same trespass, and alleged that it was for another, and concluded
by praying judgment. To this replication, there was a Special Demurrer, on the ground that the replication concluded to the country,
whereas it should have concluded with a verification. In other words,
there were two alleged defects in form in the plaintiff's replication,
but B's Special Demurrer only specified the conclusion to the country
as being incorrect. When this was held to be no defect, B then wished
to take advantage of the defect in the replication in praying judgment. The court held that such a shift could not be made; that to
this informality the Demurrer did not extend; and that it could not
"be noticed unless the defendant put his finger on the informality."' 0 5
(F) The Five Exceptions to the General Rule that Every Violation of a Rule of Pleading is a Defect in Form Available Upon
Special Demurrer.--The general rule is that any violation of a rule of
pleading constitutes a defect in form which is available upon Special
Demurrer. To this general rule, however, there were at least five exceptions, that is, there were some situations in which a mere violation of a rule of pleading was held as a matter of precedent to constitute a defect in substance. This resulted in case of (1) departure;
(2) a discontinuance; (3) a mispleader; (4) a misconception of the
correct form of action; and (5) a misjoinder of counts. The first
three of them are now aided by a verdict; the last two constitute
common law have been inpledly abolished, and therefore duplicity in pleading being,
as we have seen, a defect in form, is to be reached by an appropriate motion under
the provisions of P. L. 1578. A similar procedure obtains in other jurisdictions where
Special Demurrers are no longer recognized."
104 2 Johns. (N. Y.) *428, 426 (1807).
105 Ibid. Lamplough v. Shortridge, 1 Salk. 219, 91 Eng. Rep. 195 (1691). The
phraseology which here showed that the defendant must "put his finger on the informality," was taken directly from the early common-law case of Lamplough v. Short-

ridge, where it was said that the statute "intended" to oblige the party to lay his
finger upon the very point."

NEW YORK LAW FORUM

[VOL. 3

grounds for a motion in arrest of judgment or writ of error, but are
not aided by a verdict. 106
(G) Motions to Strike Out.-The usual method of objection to
parts of a pleading is by motion to strike out what is superfluous,
redundant, or immaterial, and thus clear up the issues by use of the
pruning hook. 0 7 By filing an amended pleading after a Demurrer is
overruled, the party waives any exception to the ruling before the
appellate court.'0 8 Therefore, a motion to strike out, rather than a
Demurrer, may be preferable to save the benefit of the objection.
XI. EFFECT OF DEMURRER-BY WAY OF ADMISSION
(A) Two Fundamental Rules Governing Admissions by Demurrer.--There are two rules that govern admission by Demurrer.
The first rule is that a Demurrer will admit any fact that is wellpleaded 0 9 and will not admit any fact that is ill-pleaded;" 0 the
106 REPPY, INTRODUCTION TO CIVm PROCEDURE, C. IV, § 2,

n.

12 (Buffalo,

1954).

107 The sufficiency of a defense must be tested by Demurrer, and cannot be considered on motion to strike a paragraph as. irrelevant. Bulova v. E. L. Barnett, Inc.,
Ill Misc. 150, 181 N. Y. Supp. 247 (Sup. Ct., 1920), order modified, 193 App. Div.
161, 183 N. Y. Supp. 495 (1st Dep't 1920).
Where questions which should have been raised by Demurrer were raised by motion
to strike portion of answer, the motion may be treated as a Demurrer. Lyons v. Farm
Property Mut. Ins. Ass'n of Iowa, 188 Iowa 506, 176 N. W. 291 (1920).
It is not the office of a Demurrer to test improper allegations concerning damages,
the remedy being by motion to strike or objection to evidence or special charges. Wester Union Telegraph Co. v. Marrism, 15 Ala. App. 532, 74 So. 88 (1917), judgment
reversed, Ex Parte Western Union Telegraph Co., 200 Ala. 496, 76 So. 438 (1917).
A Demurrer is not the proper way to test the sufficiency of a notice of defense
filed under Section 46 of the Illinois Practice Act, but a motion to strike from the
files. White v. Bourquin, 204 Ill.
App. 83, 96 (1917); Cyc. 191.
See, on Demurrers and motions to strike out, Hall v. Oneil Turpentine Co., 15
Fla. 324, 47 So. 609, 16 Ann. Cas. 738 (1908); State v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 56 Fla.
670, 47 So. 986 (1908); Southern Home Ins. Co. v. Putual, 57 Fla. 199, 49 So. 922
(1909).
108 Error in sustaining a Demurrer is waived by amending or asking leave to
amend or plead over. Bennet v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 203 Ill.
44, 67 N. E. 971
(1903).
A Demurrer may be interposed to each separate cause of action or defense, but
cannot be addressed to fragmentary parts of a pleading. Alabama: Kennon v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 92 Ala. 399, 9 So. 200 (1891); Florida: State ex rel. Ellis v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., 53 Fla. 711, 44 So. 230 (1907); 6 Cyc. 300.
109 Coxe v. Gulick, 10 N. J. L. 328 (1829).
That the rule is the same under the modern cases, see Colorado: Downey v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co., 48 Colo. 27, 108 Pac. 972 (1910); Iowa: Wapello State Say.
Bank v. Cotton, 143 Iowa 359, 122 N. W. 149 (1909); New York: Hanna v. Lichtenstein, 225 N. Y. 579, 122 N. E. 625 (1919); Wisconsin: Allen v. Chicago & N. W. R.
Co., 94 Wis. 93, 68 N. W. 873 (1896). See, also, the Decennial Digests, 214.
110 5 CosNn's DirosT, "Pleader," 292 (Dublin 1793). Coxe v. Gulick, 10 N. J. L.
328 (1829).
And under the Code, the rule is the same,--that a Demurrer will not admit ill-
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second rule is that a Demurrer will not admit any fact of which the
court takes judicial notice. And the technical objective of these two
rules was to test the legal effect of the allegations to which they were
addressed and to aid in the issue-formulation process of separating
questions of fact from questions of law, for ready reference to the
court or jury, depending on whether the pleadings terminated in an
issue of fact or an issue of law.
1. A Demurrer will Admit any Fact that is Well-Pleaded and
will not Admit any Fact that is Ill-Pleaded.--In connection with the
first rule, the question arises as to when is a fact well-pleaded or illpleaded? A fact is well-pleaded when it is required by the substantive
law as essential to the statement of a cause of action or defense, and
is then pleaded without violating any rule of pleading. A fact is illpleaded when it is not required by the substantive law as essential
to the statement of a cause of action or defense, or when, being so required, it is then pleaded in violation of one or more rules of pleading.
Thus, if A sued B in Ejectment and alleged, by way of title, that
he was seized of Blackacre, the allegation of title was well-pleaded,
because it was required by the substantive law of real property as
essential to the statement of a cause of action in Ejectment, and because it was alleged without violating any rule of pleading. If, however, A had alleged, by way of title, that he had a grant deed of
Blackacre, his allegation of title would have been ill-pleaded, as a
deed is mere evidence of title, and amounts to the statement of an
evidentiary fact, available on Special Demurrer.
Assuming that the facts are well-pleaded, a Demurrer thereto
admits, for the purpose of argument, that they are true,"' and the
pleaded facts. Heaton v. Packer, 131 App. Div. 812, 116 N. Y. Supp. 46 (1st Dep't
1909). But those facts which by fair intendment may be implied are admitted. New
York: Blum v. Whitney, 185 N. Y. 232, 77 N. E. 1159 (1906); North Carolina:
Whiteacre v. Charlotte, 216 N. C. 687, 6 S. E. 2d 558, 126 A.L.R. 438 (1940).
An admission by Demurrer cannot be used against the Demurrant at the trial.
Sprague v. New York & N. E. By. Co., 68 Conn. 345, 36 A. 791 (1896).
And see, the earlier New York case of Spencer v. Southwick, 9 Johns. (N. Y.)
314 (1812), in which it was held that an argumentative plea is not admitted by Demurrer.
A Demurrer does not admit the law, Hanna v. Lichtenstein, 225 N. Y. 579, 122
N. E. 625 (1919); and an admission by Demurrer is only for the purpose of pleading.
West v. N. J. Lewis Oyster Co., 99 Conn. 55, 121 AtI. 462 (1923).
I11 English: Barber v. Vincent, Frem. 531, 89 Eng. Rep. 398 (1580); Connecticut:
Lamphear v. Buckingham, 33 Conn. 397 ((1866); Illinois: Compher v. People, 12 Ill.
290 (1850); Nispel v. Laparle, 74 111. 306 (1874); Vermont: Mathews v. Towers, 39
Vt. 433 (1866).
It not only thus admits, but it admits the consequences of those facts, provided
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only question for the court is one of law as to whether there is any
rule of substantive law attaching legal effect to the facts stated.
The rule is subject, however, to the qualification that the matter must
be sufficiently pleaded, that is in the manner and form required by
law." 3 If the facts were not alleged in proper form, they were not
admitted by a Demurrer under the common-law rule which prevailed
prior to the Statute of Elizabeth (1585) and the Statute of Anne
(1705)."', This rule was changed by these statutes, the law of Demurrers being altered in such a way that thereafter facts not alleged
according to the form required by procedural law, might be admitted by Demurrer in some instances, and in violation of the earlier
stated rule that a Demurrer will not admit an ill-pleaded fact. Thus,
by way of illustration, in Gibbons v. Pepper,"5 A brought trespass
for assault and battery. B, whose real defense was that he did not do
the act, instead of pleading, not guilty, in the manner and form required by the common law, pleaded an argumentative denial, to wit,-"I did not do the act, the horse did it,"--and hence violated a rule
of pleading and created a defect in form in his plea. In this situation, if A had Demurred specially, specifically pointing out the defect,
he would have won; if, however, he had Demurred generally, by
reason of the statutes above mentioned, the informality in the defendant's plea would have been waived. In other words, the Demurrer, by
being General, instead of Special, amounted to a confession of the
matter informally pleaded, thus qualifying the earlier common-law
rule that a Demurrer did not admit an ill-pleaded fact."'
such consequences may fairly be considered as their legitimate results. Hyde v. Moffatt,
16 Vt. 271 (1844). And, see also, Dickerson v. Winslow, 97 Ala. 491, 11 So. 918
(1892); Cyc. 333-337, and cases there cited.
112 A Demurrer to the declaration raises a question of law whether the plaintiff,
upon the facts stated, is entitled to recovery. Virginia: Henderson v. Stringer, 6 Grat.
(Va.) 130 (1849); Federal: Hobson v. McArthur, 3 McLean, 241, Fed. Cas. No. 6,554
(1843).
It is not the office of the Demurrer to allege facts, but it is concerned with such
facts as are stated in the pleading Demurred to. Jennings v. Peoria County, 196 Ill.
App. 195 (1915).
Allegations of fact contained in a Demurrer will be disregarded.
"13 English: Rex. v. Knollys, I Ld. Raym. 10, 91 Eng. Rep. 904 (1693); Arkansas:
Pierson v. Wallace, 7 Ark. 292 (1847); Connecticut: Lamphear v. Buckingham, 33
Conn. 237 (1866); Vermont: Mathews v. Towers, 39 Vt. 433 (1866).
114 5 Com-Nn's DIGEST, "Pleader," 292 (Dublin, 1793).
115 1 ARCuBALD, Nisi PRaus, 318 (3d Am. ed. by Findlay, Philadelphia 1853).
116 Millard v. Baldwin, 3 Gray (Mass.) 484 (1855); Rex & Regina v. Knollys,
1 Ld. Raym. 10, 91 Eng. Rep. 904 (1693). "A demurrer admits the truth of such
facts as are issuable and well pleaded; but it does not admit the conclusions which
counsel may choose to draw therefrom, although they may be stated in the com-
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A Demurrer only admits facts that are well-pleaded; it does not
admit conclusions, either of fact or of law, which the adverse party
may have seen fit to draw in his pleading.' 17 Thus, in Millvile Gas
Light Company v. Sweeten, &c., et al., 11 the plaintiff alleged, under
a contract with a municipality, for the construction of a sewerage
system, the defendant dug up the streets, whereupon it became the
duty of the, city to support the sewerage system and make it safe, that
in disregard of this duty the pipes were so negligently supported, that
the plaintiff was injured. The only information derivable from the
plaintiff's declaration, with reference to the existence of the defendant's duty, was that its pipes were "laid in the said street by competent authority." On a Demurrer by the defendant, it was held that
the Demurrer did not admit the plaintiff's allegation as to its authority
to occupy the highway with its pipes; in short, a Demurrer does not
admit a conclusion of law.
But this is not always so. When the plaintiff, in stating title to
real estate alleges that he is seized of Blackacre, he is alleging a
conclusion of law, yet if the defendant Demurs, he will lose, as this
particular conclusion of law is one which, as a matter of precedent in
law, is treated as a statement of ultimate fact, and hence the Demurrer
admits it. So, when we say that a Demurrer will not admit a conclusion of law, we refer to that type of conclusion of law, which, as
a matter of precedent, is not treated as a statement of ultimate fact.
"Where the facts are stated in a pleading the pleader may, and
often should, state the conclusion from such facts upon which he bases
his right, but where the facts upon which the pleader's conclusion is
found are not stated, his conclusion from such undisclosed facts, goes
for nothing, and not being in itself a relevant fact is not admitted by
a Demurrer."" 9
And where the defendant municipality was sued for a penalty
fixed in a by-law and the defendant Demurred, it was held that the
plaint. It is to the soundness of those conclusions, whether stated in the complaint or
not, that a Demurrer is directed, and to which it applies the proper test." Branham
v. Mayor, etc. of City of San Jose, 24 Cal. 602 (1864). See, also, Illinois: Compher
v. People, 12 Il. 290 (1850); People ex rel. Harless v. Hatch, 33 DI. 9 (1863);
Federal: Hopper v. Covington, 118 U. S. 148, 6 Sup. Ct. 1025, 30 L. Ed. 190 (1886).
117 5 ComYN'Is DIGEST, "Pleader" 292 (Dublin 1793); Tresham v. Ford, Cro.
Eliz. 830, 78 Eng. Rep. 1057 (1706).
118 74 N. J. L. 24, 64 Ad. 959 (1906).
119 Id. at 25, 64 Adt. at 960. Cf. Makarell v. Bachelor, Cro. Ellz. 583, 78 Eng.
Rep. 826 (1598). See, also, Astley v. Fisher, 6 C. B. 572, 136 Eng. Rep. 1372 (1848).

NEW YORK LAW FORUM

[VOL. 3

Demurrer not only admitted the cause of action, but also the liquidated
damages as fixed by the by-law. Where, however, the damages are
unliquidated, a demurrer does not admit the claim; the damages must
1 20
be assessed by the jury.
Although a Demurrer admits facts well-pleaded, its operatiofi in
this respect is only for the purpose of determining their legal sufficiency. It is strictly confined to this purpose, and cannot be made
use of as an instrument of evidence on an issue in fact, or as evidence of facts in another cause; 121 and, as observed, the admission
1 22
was for the purpose of the argument only.
2. A Demurrer will not Admit any Fact of which the Court will
take JudicialNotice.-The second rule as to admissions by Demurrer
is that a Demurrer will not admit any fact of which the court will take
judicial notice; 123 or, put affirmatively, it will admit any fact which
conceivably may be found by the jury upon the evidence produced
at the trial. Thus, in the famous case of Barber v. Vincent,' 24 in
which the plaintiff, A, brought Indebitatus Assumpsit against B, the
defendant, for a horse sold for £20, to which B pleaded infancy,
to which A replied that the horse sold had been for the purpose of
carrying B about his necessary affairs, to which B Demurred. The
issue of law thus raised was whether B, by Demurring to A's replication admitted that the horse sold was a necessary? And the answer
120
121

McAllister, Treasurer v. Clark, 33 Conn. 253 (1866).
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Bond, 66 Fed. 693, 13 Cir. Ct. App. 665

(1895).
122 English: Tomkins v. Ashby, Moody & M. 32, 173 Eng. Rep. 1071 (1827);
Connecticut: Pease v. Phelps, 10 Conn. 62 (1834); Scovill v. Seeley, 14 Conn. 238
(1841); Havens v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co., 28 Conn. 69 (1859); Doolittle v. Selectmen of Branford, 59 Conn. 402, 22 AtI. 336 (1890); Maine: Stinson v. Gardener,
33 Me. 94 (1851).
An admission of facts by a Demurrer in one cause is not evidence of those facts
in another cause, although between the same parties. Maine: Stinson v. Gardener,
33 Me. 94 (1851); New Jersey: Shallcross v. West Jersey & Seashore R. R. Co., 75
N. J. L. 395, 67 Ad. 931 (1907); Federal: Auld v. Hepburn, 1 Cranch, C. C. 112,
Fed. Cas. No. 650 (1803).
A default, like a Demurrer, is a constructive admission of the adversary's pleading. East India Co. v. Glover, 1 Str. 612, 93 Eng. Rep. 733 (1724). But a judgment on default may be arrested or reversed, if the declaration would be insufficient
after verdict. Collins v. Gibbs, 2 Burr. 899, 97 Eng. Rep. 623 (1759).
123 Clough v. Goggins, 40 Iowa 325 (1875).
In general, on judicial notice and its implications as related to admissions by
Demurrer, see:
Articles: Hartwig, Congressional Enactment of Judicial Notice Act, 40 Micis. L.
REv. 174 (1941); Keefe, Landis & Schaad, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Notice,
2 STAxroR. L. Rxv. 664, 672 (1950).
124 Freem. 531, 89 Eng. Rep. 397 (1680).
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to this turned on whether the court could judicially notice that the
horse was a necessity to the defendant, or whether conceivably, if the
case were submitted to trial, the jury might conclude from the evidence the horse was a necessary, let us say, because it developed that
the defendant was seventeen years of age, conducting a grocery store,
and needed the horse to deliver his groceries. Since the court could
not judicially notice that the horse was a necessary, the defendant's
Demurrer to the replication admitted the plaintiff's allegation, as the
court would not judicially notice that the horse was a necessity. If,
however, the horse was changed to a pekinese dog, the court might
judicially notice that the dog was not a necessity, and hence the defendant's Demurrer would not admit the allegation in the replication that
the dog was a necessity. Another example of the operation of the
same principle is found in the case in which the plaintiff sues in trespass to real estate, the defendant pleads that he has not been served
with a summons, and the plaintiff Demurs. The defendant says, "I
win, because, by your demurrer you admit a lack of service." But
the plaintiff wins, because a Demurrer does not admit a fact of which
the writ takes judicial notice. Whether the defendant was served can
only be seen from looking at the return of the sheriff, which states
that the defendant has been served. The return of the sheriff is a
part of the common-law record, the court judicially notices its own
record, hence the court judicially knows that defendant has been
served, and what the court judicially knows is not admitted by Demurrer. 125 And this rule operates, even though the court may of its own
personal knowledge admit that a fact which is alleged, but of which it
cannot take judicial notice, is in fact untrue. Thus, in the case of Hodges
v. Steward, 2 6 in which the plaintiff brought Assumpsit upon an in125 Columbia Granite Co. v. Townsend & Co., 74 Vt. 183, 52 Atl. 432 (1902). Cf.
Southern Railway Co. v. Convenia, 100 Ga. 46, 29 S. E. 219, 62 Am. St. Rep. 312,
40 L. R. A. 253 (1896), in which it was held, in case for the negligent injury for a twoyear old child, that a demurrer did not admit the allegation, as the court judicially
knew that the services of a child that age were not valuable as it was incapable of
performing any service. And see, also, Cole v. Maunder, 2 ROLLE, ABPmoiwT 548
(London 1668); Tresham v. Ford, Cro. Eliz. 830, 78 Eng. Rep. 1051 (1706).
And where the time. of making a contract for the transportation of goods was
immaterial, and the defendant demurred on the theory that since the day laid in the
declaration was during the existence of hostilities between this country and Great
Britain, and hence the court should judicially notice that the contract was void, it
was held that since nothing appeared upon the face of the declaration to show that
the contract was void, the Demurrer admitted the plaintiff's cause of action. Amory
v. M'Gregor, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 287 (1815). Cf. Scovill v. Seeley, 14 Conn. 238 (1841).
126 3 Salk. 68, 91 Eng. Rep. 696 (1795).
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land bill of exchange, declaring upon a special custom in London for
the bearer to bring the action, he, under the custom, having the legal
title, and the defendant Demurred, it was held that since the court
only judicially noticed general customs, whereas this custom was a
local custom of England, the Demurrer admitted the local custom,
even in the face of the fact that the court knew of its own knowledge
that no such local custom existed. Accordingly, judgment was given
for the plaintiff, although the defendant might have had a good defense
if he had traversed or denied the local custom, instead of Demurring.
(B) Will a Demurrer Admit the Pleader's Conclusions as to the
Construction of the Statute?-An interesting aspect of admission by
Demurrer as affected by the doctrine of judicial notice appears in
determining whether a pleader's conclusion as to the construction of
a statute is admitted by a Demurrer. The issue was clearly presented
in the Illinois case of Compher v. People.127 It appeared that one of
the pleas to an action on a bond executed by the plaintiff as the county
collector, after referring to various statutes enacted subsequent to the
date of the bond, alleged that the liability of the sureties was materially changed; and it was insisted that the plaintiffs below, by Demurring to the plea, admitted to the truth of the construction of the
statutes as set forth by the defendant. The court held that the laws in
question were public acts, and that the plaintiffs by Demurring to a
plea construing them, did not admit such construction to be correct.
In considering this problem there are three situations to bear in
mind: (1) Where the action is based upon a local statute, and the
pleading sets out the statute in substance or verbatim, the construction of the pleader is not admitted by Demurrer, as the court takes
judicial notice of local law; (2) where a pleading sets out the terms
of a foreign statute, and then places a construction upon it, such
construction is not admitted by Demurrer; 12 8 and (3) where the
pleading states the substance of a foreign law or statute, it is treated
as any other allegation of fact, and hence is admitted by Demurrer, as
the court will not take judicial notice of a foreign statute. 129
127 12 11. 200 (1850).
128 Finney v. Guy, 189 U. S. 335, 23 S. Ct. 558, 47 L. Ed. 839 (1903).
See, also,
on this point the New York case of Hanna v. Lichtenstein, 225 N. Y. 579, 122 N. E.
625 (1919), citing Finney v. Guy, above, as authority.
-129 Iowa: American Trading & Storage Co. v. Gottstein, 125 Iowa 267, 98 N.W.
770 (1904); Federal: Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. 1, 6 S. Ct. 242, 29 L. Ed. 535

(1885).
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XII. EFFECT OF DEMURRER-IN OPENING UP THE
RECORD 30
(A) The General Rule.-It is a well-established rule that on
Demurrer to a pleading or portions of it, the court will consider the
whole record, and give judgment for the party, who on the whole,
appears entitled to it,13 ' or against the party who committed the first
substantive defect. 3 2 What this means in practice is that upon DeIn general, on the retrospective effect of a Demurrer, see:
HANDBOOK or CommoN LAw PLE"AD G, c. 12, § 152, Demurrers Opening Record, 284 (3d ed. by Ballantine, St. Paul 1923); CLARK, HANDBOOR OF nm LAW OF CODE PLEADING, C. 8, § 83, Effect of Demurrer as Opening up the
Record, 524 (2d ed., St. Paul 1947).
Articles: Millar, Retroactive Operations of the Demurrer, 10 ILL. L. Rnv. 417
(1916); Carlin, Function of a Demurrer Under a Revised Code, 41 W. VA. L. Q. 313
(1935); Pike, Objections to the Pleadings Under the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 47 YALE L. J. 50 (1937); Tripp, Some Observations on Motion Practice in
New York, 2 SYRACUSE L. RV. 273 (1951).
Annotations: 26 L.R.A. (N. S.) 117 (1909); 5 Ann. Cas. 690 (1909).
131 English: Piggot's Case, 5 Co. 29a, 77 Eng. Rep. 95 (1589); Ridgeway's Case,
3 Co. 52a, 76 Eng. Rep. 753 (1594); Foster v. Jackson, Hob. 56, 80 Eng. Rep. 201
(1615); Tippet v. May, 1 Bas. & P. 411, 126 Eng. Rep. 982 (1799); Le Bret v. PapilIon, 4 East 502, 102 Eng. Rep. 923 (1804); Marsh v. Bulteel, 5 Barn. & Ald. 507, 106
Eng. Rep. 1276 (1822); Bates v. Cart, 2 Barn. & C. 474, 107 Eng. Rep. 460 (1824);
Davies v. Penton, 6 Barn. & C. 216, 108 Eng. Rep. 433 (1827); Connecticut: Bishop
v. Quintard, 18 Conn. 395 (1847); Florida: Miller v. Kingsbury, 8 Fla. 356 (1859);
Illinois: McFadden v. Fortier, 20 IlI. 509 (1858); Haynes v. Lucas, 50 IMI.436 (1869);
176 (1870); Illinois Fire Ins. Co.
Mount Carbon Coal Co. & R. Co. v. Andrews, 53 Ill.
354 (1870); Ft. Dearborn Lodge v. Kline, 115 il. 177, 3 N. E. 272,
v. Stanton, 57 Ill.
453, 35 N. E. 867 (1893); Dis56 Am. St. Rep. 133 (1885); Dupee v. Blake, 148 Ill.
tilling & Cattle Feeding Co. v. People, 156 Ill. 448, 41 N. E. 188, 47 Am. St. Rep. 20
374, 77 N. E. 441, 5 Am. Cas. 690 (1906); Heim(1895); Hedrick v. People, 221 Ill.
448, 92 N. E. 297 (1910); New Hampberger v. Elliot Frog & Switch Co., 245 111.
shire: Leslie v. Harlow, 18 N. H. 518 (1847); Clagget v. Simes, 31 N. H. 22 (1855);
New York: The Auburn & Owasco Canal Co. v. Leitch, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 65 (1847);
Pennsylvania: Barnett v. Barnett, 16 Serg. & P. (Pa.) 51 (1827); Virginia: Day v.
Pickett, 4 Mum. (Va.) 104 (1813); Federal: Gorman v. Lenox, 15 Peters (U. S.) 115,
10 L. Ed. 680 (1840); Townsend v. Jemison, 7 How. (U. S.) 706, 12 L. Ed. 880 (1849).
And that the rule is the same under the Code, see Pierce v. Bristol, 130 Misc. 188,
223 N. Y. Supp. 678 (1927). See, also, Baxter v. McDonnell, 154 N. Y. 432, 48 N. E.
816 (1897).
132 That the situation on Demurrer is the same under the Code, see Schwab v.
Furniss, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 704, at 704-5 (1852) in which SANDroRD, J., declared: "... On
a demurrer to a pleading, or portions of it, the rule now is the same as it was before
the code of procedure, that judgment shall be given against the party who committed
the first substantial fault. That is, if the demurrer be to an answer, and it appear that
the complaint does not show a cause of action, judgment shall be given against the
plaintiff and the complaint dismissed. (Code, Sec. 148). If the demurrer be to the
reply, the plaintiff may show that the answer is insufficient, and have judgment in his
favor.
"There is no more reason now than formerly, that a plaintiff should have judgment on demurring to an answer, when it appears upon the face of the record that he
has no cause of action; or that the defendant should succeed on demurrer to the reply,
when it is apparent upon his answer that he has no defence."
130

Treatises: SmprMAN,
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murrer, the court goes back to the declaration and makes a search
of the record for substantive defects, taking each stage of the pleadings in order, and then gives judgment against the party guilty of the
first substantive error. Before a party pleads, therefore, he should
be certain that his own fences are in good repair. Thus, if the plaintiff declares in Detinue for a specific chattel, but fails to allege title,
the defendant pleads the Statute of Limitations, to which the plaintiff
Demurs, judgment will go for the defendant, the plaintiff having
failed to state title in his declaration, thus making himself guilty of
the first substantive defect. And, on demurrer to a replication, if the
court regards the replication bad, but perceives a substantive defect
in the plea, judgment will be given, not for the defendant, but for the
plaintiff, provided the declaration is good as a matter of substantive
law; but if the declaration is defective in point of substance, then,
upon the same principle, judgment would be given in favor of the
defendant.' 3 3 The Demurrer, at whatever stage of the pleadings it is
interposed, reaches back in its effect, through the whole record, and
18 4
ultimately attaches to the first substantive defect in the pleading,
on whichever side it may have occurred; and therefore, though the
parties join in the demurrer upon any particular point, at any stage
of the pleadings, judgment must still be given upon the whole record,
and regularly against the party in whose pleading such fault occurred.
This rule belongs to the general principle that when judgment is to
be given, whether the issue be in law or fact, and whether the cause
has proceeded to issue or not, the court is always bound to examine
the whole record and adjudge for the plaintiff or defendant, according to the legal right, as it may, on the whole, appear.3 This rule,
however, is, at common law, subject to at least six exceptions.
'33

Piggot's Case, 5 Co. 29a, 77 Eng. Rep. 95 (1589), and cases cited above.

See, also, Chelsea Exch. Bank v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 173 App. Div. 829, 160 N. Y.
Supp. 225 (1st Dep't 1916). Cf. Ex parte Hines, 205 Ala. 17, 87 So. 691 (1920), granting certiorari in Hines v. McMillan, 17 Ala. App. 509, 87 So. 696 (1920).
134 The reason for this rule is forcibly stated in the case of Ordinary v. Bracey,
1 Brev. (S. C.) 191, 196 (1802) by GRimxE, J., who declared: "And the reason of
this course of proceeding in the court is fundamentally right; for should they, in the
first
instance, rectify the last fault, they must then hear another motion to set the
preceding one to rights also: by which mode half a dozen questions might be made
on the propriety of proceedings, only one of which might be determined at any one
court. This would be the means of lengthening out an issue to an unreasonable length
of time, and to the very great delay of justice. Whereas, by the rule laid down above,
that the court will look for the first fault, and give judgment accordingly, all the
subsequent defective proceedings are at once, and by one single decision, set at naught,
and dismissed."
135 STErnx,
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(B) Exceptions to the General Rule.-The first exception is that
a Demurrer will not open up the record back to the declaration when
the plaintiff, at the replication stage of pleading, Demurs specially to
the defendant's plea, which is substantially defective, and there is
a defect in form in the declaration. This results from the Statute of
Elizabeth, 36 which provided for waiver of all defects in form unless
objected to at the next succeeding stage in pleading, or to put the
matter in another way, a Special Demurrer only opens up the record
back to the next preceding plea as to form, whereas, as to substance,
it goes all the way back to the declaration, since, as previously observed, a Special Demurrer includes a general. Thus, to illustrate
the point, if A puts in a declaration good in substance, but bad in
form, B puts in a plea good in form and bad in substance, and A
Demurs specially, B will lose for two reasons, one because the defect
in form in A's declaration is not open on A's Special Demurrer; it was
waived by B's failure to Demur specially at the second stage of pleading; two, because B was guilty of the first substantive defect, which
was available even on A's Special Demurrer, which included a General,
13 7
and without regard to the formal defect in A's declaration.
The second exception occurs where the plaintiff Demurs to a plea
in abatement. Thus, for instance, let us suppose that A sues in ejectment, but fails to allege title, that B pleads that he was sued in the
wrong county, but fails to give the plaintiff a better writ, or to tell
him in what county he might be sued in. This is a plea in abatement,
defective in form for failure to give the plaintiff a better writ. Now,
suppose A Demurs generally to the plea. Does the Demurrer reach
back to the defect in the plaintiff's declaration, that is, his failure
to allege title. If it were permitted to do so, the defendant would win
the case on the merits, without having taken any chance of losing
it on the merits, as, with one exception, on a plea in abatement
the judgment is never on the merits. In order to prevent the
defendant from winning when, by his plea in abatement he took no
chance of losing on the merits, an exception to the rule as to the
retrospective effect of a Demurrer was created where the Demurrer
was interposed to a plea in abatement, and where, to permit the Demurrer to search the whole record, would sooner or later, as illus136 27 Eliz. c. 5, § 1, 6 Statutes at Large 360 (1585).
137 English: Humphreys v. Bethily, 2 Vent. 198, 86 Eng. Rep. 391 (1690); Vermiont: Dunlevy v. Fenton, 80 Vt. 506, 68 Ati. 651, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1009 (1908);
5 ComrYi's DIGEST, "Pleader" E. 1; Id. F. 4 (Dublin 1793).
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trated by the case above, result in a victory for the defendant where
he had no chance to lose. 188
The third exception arises where there has been a discontinuance
along one of several lines of pleading. An example of this may be
seen in the case of Tippet v. May,' 30 in which the plaintiff declared
in Assumpsit against A, B and C. Two of the defendants, A and B,
pleaded a debt of record by way of set-off, without taking any notice
of the third. The plaintiff replied, nul tiel record, and gave a day to
produce the records to the two defendants A and B, but entered no
suggestion on the roll respecting the third, C. To this replication,
there was a General Demurrer. The court held that the plaintiff,
having replied to a plea by two of the defendants without taking notice of the third against whom they declared, had made a discontinuance; that the cause being discontinued, judgment must be given
against the plaintiff, as they were not in a position to take advantage of the defect in the defendant's plea. 4 To put the matter in another way, the plaintiff, by neglecting to sign judgment against the
defendant, on allegations the latter failed to answer, caused a discon138 Professor Charles A. Keigwin explains this point as follows: "Pleas in Abatement are not within the operation of the usual rule, and that for two reasons: (1) in
point of policy such pleas are discouraged, because odious in law and often prejudicial
to justice; and (2) in point of principle, a plea in abatement is addressed, not to the
declaration, but to the writ upon which the declaration is based, and the purpose of
the plea is to abate or quash the writ for some defect in the framing of the case.
Therefore, on demurrer to a plea in abatement, the defendant cannot turn the demurrer against the declaration. Should the plea be replied to and the replication
demurred to, the general principle operates so far as to carry the demurrer back to the
plea, but not to make available any objections to the declaration." CASES 3N CoM'raoN
LAW PLEADING, Bk. 11, The Rules of Pleading, 450 (2d ed., Rochester 1934).
See, also, on the same point, the following cases: English: Hastrop v. Hastings,
1 Salk. 212, 91 Eng. Rep. 189 (1692); Belayse v. Hester, 2 Lut. 1592, 125 Eng. Rep.
873 (1696); Routh v. Weddell, 2 Lut. 1667, 125 Eng. Rep. 915 (1703); Alabama: Cobb. v. Miller, 9 Ala. 499 (1846); Humphrey v. Whitten, 17 Ala. 30 (1849);
Arkansas: Knott v. Clements, 13 Ark. 335 (1853); Illinois: Hunter v. Bilyeu, 39 Ill.
367 (1866); Finch v. Galigher, 181 11. 631, 54 N. E. 611 (1899); Indiana: Price v.
Grand Rapids & I. R. Co., 18 Ind. 137 (1862); Massachusetts: Clifford v. Cony, 1 Mass.
495 (1805); New Jersey: Birch v. King, 71 N. J. L. 392, 59 A. 11 (1904); New York:
Shaw v. Dutcher, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 216 (1838); Rhode Island: Ellis v. Ellis, 4 R. I.

110 (1856).
The exception as to tie retrospective effect of a Demurrer to a plea in abatement
also prevails under the Code. Hotel Co. v. Ricketts, 77 Ind. App. 458, 132 N. E. 303
(1921).
139 1 Bos. & Pull. 411, 126 Eng. Rep. 982 (1799). See, also, Illinois: Hunter v.
Bilyeu, 39 Ill. 367 (1866); New Jersey: Fleming v. Mayor, etc. of City of Hoboken,
4 N. J. L. 270 (1878).
140 This type of error was touched upon in the Statute of Mispleadings, Jeofails,
32 Hen. VIII, c. 30, 2 Statutes at Large 282 (1540).
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tinuance of the action. The principle involved was that the plaintiff,
by omitting to follow up his entire demand against the three defendants, created an interruption in the proceedings, which is technically
known as a "discontinuance," and which creates an error on the record. The commission of this fault places the plaintiff where he is in
no position to ask for judgment; but such an error is now generally
cured by one of the statutes of Jeofails, 14' after verdict, as well as
after judgment.
The fourth exception appears where a plaintiff Demurs to several
pleas, one of which is a plea of the general issue. Thus, in The
Auburn & Owasco Canal Company v. Leitch,142 where the plaintiff
declared in Assumpsit for certain installments due upon shares of the
capital stock of the plaintiff's corporation, subscribed for by the defendant, the defendant pleaded non assumpsit and nul tiel corporation; to which the plaintiff replied, setting out the act incorporating
the plaintiff, to which replication the defendant Demurred, the court
held that the declaration was bad in substance, and that the Demurrer
would open up the record back to the declaration; that the earlier
case of Wheeler v. Curtis,148 which held to the contrary, had been
141 Ibid.
142 4 Denlo (N. Y.) 65 (1847).
143 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 653 (1834). In accord: Baldwin v. City of Aberdeen, 23
S. D. 636, 123 N. W. 80 (1909). Other New York cases decided between the Wheeler
(1834) and Auburn & Owasco Canal Co. (1847) cases, include: Dearborn v. Kent,
14 Wend. (N. Y.) 183 (1835); Russell v. Rogers, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 351 (1836).
Cf. Miller v. Maxwell, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 9 (1836).
The earliest mention of this rule in Illinois was in Brawner v. Lomax, 23 Ill.
496 (1860), which was decided without any reference to the New York decisions. Weir
v. Jacksonville & Savannah R. R. Co., 24 M. 593 (1560), was decided against the retrospective effect of the Demurrer on the theory that a party could not plead and Demur
at the same time to the same pleading. Other cases followed: Wilson v. Myrick, 26 Ill.
34 (1861); Reeves v. Forman, 26 Ill. 313 (1861); Clayton v. Menger, 51 11. 373
(1869); Brackett v. People, 72 MI1.593 (1874); McNulta v. Lockridge, 137 Ill. 270,
27 N. E. 452 (1891); Chicago Union Traction Co. v. ferka, 227 I1. 95, 81 N. E. 7

(1907).
Although there were many English cases between the Statute of Anne in 1705 and
the superseding Common Law Procedure Acts of 1852, 1854 and 1860, in which the
question as to whether a Demurrer would open up the record where the defendant Demurred to several pleas, one of which was a plea of the general issue, might have been
decided, it must be noted that the rule, far from originating in the courts at Westminster, actually must be attributed to the "common law regime in New York," which
produced the case of Wheeler v. Curtis, 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 653 (1833).
The situation in England was summarized by the Commissioners on the Superior
Courts of Common Law, when they declared: "On the contrary, the retroactive operation of demurrer was consciously permitted by the English courts in this instance.
In an account of certain features of the common law practice, it was authoritatively
said in 1830: 'The defendant occasionally resorts to the expedient of pleading in addition to some plea sufficient in point of law, another which he knows to be insufficient,
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erroneously decided on the theory that to permit the Demurrer to operate retroactively would violate the well-established rule that the defendant could not both plead and demur to the same count. 44
The fifth exception occurs where the plaintiff demurs to several
pleas, which have been entered by the defendant after his Demurrer
to the declaration has been overruled. Some courts hold, as for example, in Stearns v. Cope,145 that where the defendant has Demurred to
the declaration, his Demurrer has been overruled, whereupon he pleaded over, an exception is created to the general rule, that is that the
court having once passed on the sufficiency of the declaration it is
but to contain a true statement of facts. He thus sometimes succeeds in compelling the
plaintiff to take issue in fact upon the first plea, and to demur to the second; and, as
upon the argument of the demurrer, the Court looks to the whole record, and decides
against the party first in fault, the defendant, instead of supporting his second plea,
attacks the declaration, and thus, in effect, both demurs and pleads to the declaration."' TmaRD REPORT or COMnSSIONERS OF TM SUPERIOR COURTS OF COmon LAW,

26 (London 1830).
144 In referring to this specific point, BRONSON, C. J., observed: "It is quite clear
that the defendant cannot both plead and demur to the same count. And it is equally
clear, that at the common law, he could not have two pleas to the same count. Indeed the two things, though stated in different words, are only parts of one commonlaw rule; to wit, that the defendant cannot make two answers to the same pleading.
The Statute of 4 and 5 Anne, c. 16, was made to remedy this inconvenience; and it
allowed the defendant, with the leave of the court, to plead as many several matters
as he should think necessary. (2 R. S. 352, § 9). The statute does not say that the
defendant may both plead and demur; and consequently he cannot make two such
answers. But he may plead two or more pleas; some of which may terminate in
issues of fact, to be tried by a jury; while others may result in issues of law, to be
determined by the court. And whenever we come to a demurrer, whether it be to the
plea, replication, rejoinder, or still further onward, the rule is to give judgment against
the party who committed the first fault in pleading, if the fault be such as would
make the pleading bad on general demurrer. This rule has always prevailed. It
was the rule prior to the statute of Anne; and to say that the defendant, because he
pleads two pleas, one of which results in a demurrer, cannot go back and attack the
declaration, would be to deprive him of a portion of the privilege which the legislature intended to confer. He cannot plead and demur at the same time, because the
common law forbids it: and the statute does not allow it. But he may plead two
pleas; one of which is, that whenever there comes a demurrer upon either of
the two lines of pleading, he may run back upon that line to see which party committed the first fault; and against that party judgment will be rendered. Aside from
the dicta in question, there is not a shadow of authority, either here or in England,
for a different doctrine." The Auburn & Owasco Canal Co. v. Leitch, 4 Denio (N. Y.)
65, at 67 (1847).
In favor of the view that the Demurrer will not open up the record, where the
plaintiff Demurs to one of several pleas, and one is a plea of the general issue, see
Lesile v. Harlow, 18 N. H. 518 (1847). Contra: Wilson v. Myrick, 26 IlE. 34 (1861).
145 109 Ill. 340 (1884).
Historically, it may be said that no such rule was developed by the English cases,
and in Illinois, it originated with the case of Brawner v. Lomax, 23 Ill. 496 (1860),
although the rule may have been foreshadowed in McFadden v. Fastier, 20 Ill. 509
(1858). See, also, Bills v. Stanton, 69 Ill. 51 (1873).
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incompetent for tfe same tribunal, at a succeeding term, to reverse
the decision; also, that the defendant having submitted to the first
decision, he thereby waived the defect, if any. But in Cumminhs v.
Gray,148 the opposite view was taken.
The sixth exception deals with the case where, though the right,
on the whole record, appears to be with the plaintiff, he has not put
his action on that ground. Thus, where, in an action on a covenant
to perform an award, and not to prevent the arbitrators from making
it, the plaintiff declared in Covenant, and assigned, as a breach, that
the defendant would not pay the sum awarded, and the defendant
pleaded a revocation of the authority of the arbitrators by deed, before award made, to which the plaintiff Demurred, the court held the
plea good as being a sufficient answer to the breach alleged, and
therefore gave judgment for the defendant, although they were of
opinion that the matter stated in the plea would have entitled the
plaintiff to maintain his action if he had alleged, by way of breach,
that the defendant had prevented the arbitrators from making their
1 47

award.

XIII. JUDGMENT ON DEMURRER
(A) The General Rule.7-The general rule is that a Demurrer,
either general or special, follows the nature of the pleading Demurred
to; and accordingly the result will be different where the Demurrer
is directed to a dilatory plea as opposed to a plea in bar.
(B) Where the Demurrer is Directed to a Plea in Abatement.Thus, a judgment on a plea in abatement, if for the defendant, is that
the writ be quashed; if for the plaintiff, it is a judgment of respondeat
ouster, or that the defendant answer over on the merits. 48
4 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 397 (1833).
Marsh v. Bulteel, 5 Barn. & Aid. 507, 106 Eng. Rep. 1276 (1882).
And, for variation of the result in the Marsh case, see Head v. Baldrey, 6 Ad.
& El. 459, 112 Eng. Rep. 175 (1873).
Some authorities have included the seventh exception having in mind Brooke v.
Brooke, 1 Sid. 184, 82 Eng. Rep. 1046 (1664) where it was held that a motion in
arrest of. judgment, which is an equivalent of the Demurrer in this regard, does not open
up the record where a substantive defect in the plaintiff's declaration is cured by the
plea. For an American case to the same effect, see Probate Court v. Vanduzer, 13 Vt.
135 (1841). But as to whether an allegation in the reply will cure an omission in the
declaration, see Marine Trust Co. v. St. James A. M. E. Church, 85 N. J. L. 272, 88 A.
146
147

1075 (1913).

Silver v. Rhodes, 2 Harr. (Del.) 369 (1837).
For the modern rule as to final judgment, on a Demurrer to a jlIea in abatement,
see Note, Pleading-Pleain Abatement-Code, 18 M cH. L. R.v. 433 (1920).
148
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(C) Where the Demurrer is Directed to Any Pleading in Bar.Where the Demurrer is directed to any pleadings in chief, such as the
declaration, plea in bar, or other subsequent pleading, which goes to
the action, the judgment is final, that is, if for the plaintiff, quod re1 9 In other words, on
cuperet; if for the defendant, quod et sine die.U
Demurrer to any pleadings in bar of the action, the judgment for
either party will, at common law, be the same as upon an issue of
fact joined in the same pleading, and found in favor of the same
party.150 At common law, in case of a judgment in favor of the party
Demurring, it was final against the other party, and disposed of the
action on the merits. The latter could not amend his pleadings and go
on with the action. But in time the rule was relaxed. Under modern
practice and statutes, however, generally the courts will permit him to
amend. So, likewise, if the judgment writ was against the party Demurring, it was final at common law. 5 ' Since any admissions by
Demurrer were for the purpose of argument, being an appeal to the
judgment as to whether the defendant was bound to answer the plaintiff, upon his own showing, in modern practice, a judgment is not
final. In consequence, if on Demurrer, the defendant prevailed, the
plaintiff is given leave to amend his declaration; and, if the Demurrer was overruled, the defendant is permitted to withdraw his
Demurrer and plead over on the merits. 5 2
(D) Election to Stand on Demurrer.-If, however, the defendant's Demurrer was overruled, and he was still of the opinion that he
149 See GOULD, THa PRwICIPLES OF PLEADING AT CommoN LAW, c. IX, § 42 (6th ed.
by Will, Albany 1909).
150 English: Humphreys v. Bethily, 2 Vent. 222, 86 Eng. Rep. 405 (1639); Alabama: Perkins v. Moore, 16 Ala. 17 (1849); Delaware: Silver v. Rhodes, 2 Harr. (Del.)
369 (1837); Georgia: Gray v. Gray, 34 Ga. 499 (1866); Illinois: Mt. Carbon Coal
& R. Co. v. Andrews, 53 Ill. 176 (1870); Weiss v. Binian, 178 Ill. 241, 52 N. E. 969
(1899); Maine: State v. Peck, 60 Me. 498 (1872); Maryland: Brown v. Jones, 10
Gill. & J. (Md.) 334 (1839); New Hampshire: Little v. Perkins, 3 N. H. 469 (1826);
New Jersey: Hale v. Lawrence, 22 N. J. L. 72 (1849); New York: Bouchaud v. Dias,
3 Denio (N. Y.) 238 (1846); Federal: Martin v. Bartow Iron Works, 35 Ga. 320, Fed.
Cas. No. 9,157 (1866).
151 Hale v. Lawrence, 22 N. J. L. 72 (1849); State v. Peck, 60 Me. 498 (1872).
152 This rule is subject to the qualification that the party whose Demurrer is overruled must take no steps from which a waiver of his Demurrer might be implied, such
as leave .to plead over. Bennett v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 203 Ill. 439, 67 N. E. 971
(1903).
On the effect of an overruled Demurrer, not withdrawn, as an admission of the
facts, see Carter v. Wright, 22 N. Y. 472 (1860).
And the rule is the same under the Code, a defendant being permitted to answer
over on the merits after a motion, substituted in lieu of a demurrer, has been denied.
Ansorage v. Kane, 244 N. Y. 395, 155 N. E. 683 (1927). See, also, Ill. Ann. Stat. (SmithHurd) c. 110, § 169(3).
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was correct on his theory of the law, he might, as was said, elect
to "stand on his Demurrer," or refuse to withdraw it and enter a plea
to the merits. In such an event his next move was to seek a review
in the appellate court on a writ of error. The judgment in the appellate court, under such circumstances was final and on the merits,
whether the writ of error was sustained or overruled.
(E) Where the Defendant Demurs in Abatement.-A Demurrer
to a plea in abatement and a Demurrer in abatement should be clearly
distinguished. As previously observed the Statute of Elizabeth (1585)
and the Statute of Anne (1705) did not apply to pleas in abatement,
hence as before the statutes, so, likewise, after the statutes, a General Demurrer was sufficient to reach a defect in a plea in abatement.1 5 3 . But where a defendant entered a Demurrer, and assigned as
ground of his Demurrer, matter which ought to have been pleaded in
abatement, the Demurrer was treated as a General Demurrer, the matter in abatement was ignored, and the court gave a final judgment on
the merits. Thus, to illustrate in the leading case of Tyler v. Hand,54 A
brought suit upon ten bonds payable to the President of the United
States and his successors in office, demanding the principal and interest
due. B, the defendant, Demurred to the plaintiff's declaration, pursuing
the usual form of a General Demurrer, and then assigned as cause of
Demurrer matter of abatement. The court below sustained the Demurrer, and on writ of error, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the case was remanded. Why? The answer lies in the nature of a plea in abatement as contrasted to a plea in bar. When a defendant Demurs, and assigns for cause of Demurrer matter which
should be the subject-matter of a plea in abatement, he is at one and
the same time requesting the court to do an impossible thing, that is, to
render a judgment on the merits and not to render a judgment on the
merits. Accordingly, as pleas in abatement are always strictly construed, the Demurrer in abatement is rejected, and contrary to the
case of a Demurrer to a plea in abatement, in which case the judgment is not final, the judgment thereon is final, as a Demurrer cannot
partake of the character of a plea in abatement. 5 5
The effort on the part of a pleader to take advantage of matter
153 English: Walden v. Holman, 2 Ld. Raym. 1015, 92 Eng. Rep. 175 (1703);
Alabama: Humphreys v. Whitten, 17 Ala. 30 (1849); New York: Shaw v. Dutcher, 19
Wend. (N. Y.) 216 (1838).
154 7 How. (U. S.) 573 (1849).
155 Dominique v. Davenant, 1 Salk. 220, 91 Eng. Rep. 195 (1795).
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in abatement upon a General Demurrer is doubtless a hangover of the
Demurrer which had a dual aspect, sometimes directed at defects apparent upon the face of the pleading and sometimes being directed at
defects extrinsic to the pleading, or dilatory in character."'
(F) Effect of Judgment on Demurrer-Res Judicata.-A final
judgment rendered on Demurrer is as conclusive of the facts confessed
by the Demurrer as a verdict finding the same facts would have been
since they are established, in both cases, by matter of record. The
judgment in such case operates as an estoppel, and facts thus established can never afterwards be contested between the same parties, or
those in privity with them, in another suit. 157 If, therefore, on a
Demurrer to a declaration, judgment is rendered for the defendant,
the plaintiff can never afterwards maintain against the same defendant, or those in privity with him, any similar action upon the same
grounds or involving the same subject matter as were disclosed in
the first declaration, unless such judgment result from the omission
of an essential allegation. In the latter instance the judgment would
be no bar to a second action supplying the missing allegation; nor is
it a bar, where the action is misconceived, to an action afterwards
brought in proper form. The ground upon which the estoppel rests,
in these instances, is a. determination of the merits of the action,
which, by reason of the admitted facts shown upon the record, the
unsuccessful party is precluded from again bringing into question.
And the result confirms the view that one of the fundamental functions of pleading is to preserve a record of a controversy once liti156 Since the abolition of pleas in abatement by the Code, defects formerly available on this plea are now taken advantage of in the answer. New York: Gardner v.
Clark, 21 N. Y. 399 (1860); Oklahoma: Maxia v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co., 74
Okla. 31, 176 P. 907 (1918).

In general, on the effect of a judgment on Demurrer as Res Judicata, see:
Articles: Loomis, The Effect of a Demurrer Sustaining a Demurrer to a Complaint,
157

9 YALE L. J. 387 (1900); Von Moscbzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L. J. 299, 318-323
(1929).
Comments: Effect of Judgment Entered on Demurrer,30 CALIF. L. REV. 487 (1942);
REsTATExENT, JuDGmENTs, §§ 50, 51 (1942).
See, also, the following cases: Illinois: Vanlandingham v. Ryan, 17 Ill. 25 (1855);
Indiana: Wilson v. Ray, 24 Ind. 156 (1865); Federal: Bissell v. Spring Valley Twp.,
124 U. S. 225, 8 S. Ct. 495, 31 L. Ed. 411 (1888); Cf. Indiana: Stevens v. Dunbar,
1 Blackf. (Ind.) 56 (1820); Massachusetts: Wilbur v. Gilmore, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 250

(1838).
A former judgment on a Demurrer to the complaint is not a plea in bar where
the error in the first pleading has been corrected by the second. Cohen & Son v. M.
Lurie Woolen Co., 232 N. Y. 112, 133 N. E. 370 (1921). Cf. 32 W. VA. L. REV.
248 (1926).
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gated, in order to serve as a basis of a plea of res judicata and thus
prevent the relitigation of a cause once settled.
XIV. STATUS OF THE DEMURRER-UNDER MODERN
CODES, PRACTICE ACTS AND THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
IN somm states, under modem codes and practice acts, the Demurrer has been abolished, 15 8 but in lieu thereof the same defects,
formerly available on Demurrer, may be reached in England, by what
is now called an objection in law, filed with the answer, and heard
before trial, where calculated to dispose of the case; in some states,
like New Jersey and New York, by motion; and in the federal courts
by a compromise between the two methods outlined above, permitting the choice of either course at the option of the objecting party.
In those states which have abolished the Demurrer outright, the reform which followed, as in New Jersey and New York has substituted the motion for judgment on the pleadings, or, as in England,
has replaced the Demurrer with the objection in law.
(A) The Motion as a Substitute for the Demurrer in New Jersey.--Thus, in New Jersey, the statute 59 provides: Section 26.
"Demurrers abolished. Any pleading may be struck out on motion
on the ground that it discloses no cause of action, defense or counterclaim respectively. The order made upon such motion is appealable
after final judgment. In lieu of a motion to strike out, the same objection, and any point of law (other than a question of pleading and
158 Mich. St. Ann. (Henderson), § 27.814 (1936); N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2:27-140
(1939) and N. J. Sup.. Ct. Rule 40 (1938); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 19-101(7c) (1941);
Tex. Civ. Proc. (Vernon), Rules 90, 91 (1942), operates to abolish only the General
Demurrer.
As on Demurrer, a defendant may answer over on the merits after a motion is
denied. Ansorage v. Kane, 244 N. Y. 395, 155 N. E. 683 (1927).
In general, on the abolition of the Demurrer, see:
Articles: Edgerton, The Consolidation of Preliminary Motions and Demurrers in
Connecticut, 22 YALE L. J. 302 (1913); Rothschild, The Simplification of Civil Practice
in New York, 23 CoL. L. REv. 618, 732, 747 (1923) ; Cook, Effect of the Abolition of the
Equitable. Demurrer in Iowa, 10 IowA L. REV. 193 (1925); Atkinson, Pleading the
Statute of Limitations, 36 YALE L. J. 914 (1927) ; Rotwein, Pleading and Practice Under
the New Federal Rules-A Survey and Comparison, 8 BRoOxLYN L. REV. 188 (1938);
Pike, Objections to Pleading Under the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 47 YALE
L. J. 50 (1939); Clark, Simplified Pleading in Connecticut, 16 Conn. B. J. 83, 94
(1942); Brown, Some Problems Under Federal Rule 12(b), 27 Mum. L. REv. 415
(1943).
Comment: Motions to Dismiss Under New Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 Rocx"
MT. D. REV. 131 (1942).
159 N. J. Stat. Ann. § 2:27-140 (1939) and N. J. Sup. Ct. Rule 40 (1928).
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practice) may be raised in the answering pleadings, and may be disposed of at, or after trial; but the court, on motion of either party,
may determine the question so raised before trial, and if the decision
be decisive of the whole case the court may give judgment for the
successful party or make such order as may be just."
Section 27 provides: "Objections to pleadings other than those
provided for in rule 26, shall be made by motion. The action of the
court is appealable after final judgment."
Section 28 provides: "Every motion addressed to a pleading, must
present every cause of objection then existing."
The provisions of this statute were clearly based upon the Federal Equity Rules of 1912, Rule 29, which permitted defenses in
point of law to be raised either by motion or by answer.
How effective this reform has been is clearly seen in Savage v.
Public Service Ry. Co.,160 in which the plaintiff in a case for personal
injuries alleged that, as a passenger while standing on the rear platform
of the car, about to enter the body of the said car, she was suddenly
jerked from her feet and thrown to the floor of the car "by the negligent operation thereof." After the pleadings were completed, and the
case came on for trial, on the basis of a reserved right, the defendant moved to strike out the complaint on the ground that the complaint disclosed no cause of action, in that a general allegation of
negligence was insufficient. The motion was sustained, judgment was
entered, whereupon the defendant appealed. Adverting to the abolition of the Demurrer by the provisions as set out above, the court
proceeded with the discussion of the issue as to whether a general
allegation of negligence was good as against the motion. CHn Jusdeclared: "The question upon which the determination
TICE Guyrmim
of this appeal depends is whether the complaint could have been
successfully attacked by a general demurrer, upon the ground that it
disclosed no cause of action; and we think that it must be answered
in the negative. In the case of CentralRailroad Co. v. Van Horn, 38
N.J.L. 133, 138, the defendant interposed a demurrer to the second
count of a declaration, which showed merely that the plaintiff was in
one of the cars of the defendant under a duty by it to carry her
safely, and while there that she was, 'through the negligence, carelessness and misdirection of the defendant and its agents and servants,
thrown from and under coaches of the said defendant.' It was held
16

95 N. J. L. 432, 113 At. 252 (1921).
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by the Supreme Court that, although this averment was so uncertain
and insufficient in detail as to afford the defendant little, if any, information as to what the specific act of negligence was, or what
agency of the company was responsible for it, it was clearly good on
a General Demurrer, the defect being one of form and not of substance. In Breese v. Trenton Horse Railroad Co., 52 Id. 250, 253, a
count which stated in general terms that by the careless management
of the car in a public street by the agents of the defendant it thereby
ran over the body and arm of the plaintiff, it was held good on a General Demurrer. In Race v. Easton and Amboy Railroad Co., 62 Id.
536, a count in a declaration simply averring, in effect, that by reason
of the negligent and improper running of defendant's railroad train,
and blowing of the whistle on its locomotive, a horse which was being
driven on the highway by the plaintiff became frightened and overturned the wagon, and that plaintiff was thrown out and injured, although not specific enough for a proper pleading was permitted to
stand as against a General Demurrer. Ferguson v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 64 Id. 222, is to the same effect. In Minnuci v. Philadephia and Reading RailroadCo., 68 Id. 432, it was declared that an
averment in a declaration which stated that the plaintiff's injuries
were caused solely by the negligence of the defendant, without more,
although it did not fulfill the requirement of the rule of pleading that
the certainty of the statement of the plaintiff's case must be such as
in a reasonable measure to apprise the defendant of the case to be
made against him, was good on General Demurrer."
From the foregoing, it would seem clear that in N-w-T[sey the
abolition of the demurrer in lieu of the motion, in effect has- been
merely in name only.'
(B) The Motion as a Substitute in Lieu of a Demurrer in New
York.-In New York, it may be assumed that the first Statute of
Demurrers, enacted in February, 1788,162 was abolished by Sections
122 and 123, of the Laws of New York, 1848.63
161 The rules governing motions in lieu of the Demurrer under the New Jersey
Practice Act of 1912 have been superseded by Rule 4:7-3 of the New Jersey Civil Practice Rules, which provides: "Demurrers, . . . and exceptions for insufficiency of a
pleading are superseded." Of course defects formerly reached by Demurrer or by the
motion in lieu of the Demurrer, as provided by the Practice Act of 1912, are, under
the new Civil Practice Rules, still reached by motion. See the case of Newark Twentieth Century Taxicab Ass'n v. Lerner, 11 N. J. Super. 363, 78 A. 2d 315 (1951).
162 Laws of New York (1788), c. XXXIII, § VII.
163 Laws of New York (1848), c. 379, §§ 122, 123.
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Section 122 provided: "The Defendant may demur to the complaint, when it shall appear upon the face thereof, either:
1. That the court has no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, or the subject of the action; or
2. That the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue; or
3. That there is another action pending between the same parties, for the same cause; or
4. That there is a defect of parties, plaintiff or defendant; or
5. That several causes of action have been improperly united; or
6. That the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action."
Section 123 provided: "The demurrer shall distinctly specify the
grounds of objection to the complaint. Unless it do so, it may be
disregarded."
Under these two statutory provisions, all prior grounds of General
and Special Demurrer were in effect compressed into some one of six
possible reasons for a Demurrer, and all Demurrers became Special,
as under Section 123 of the statute, Demurrers which failed to specify
the grounds of Demurrer were to be disregarded.
Under an Act Relating to Courts, Officers of Justice, and Civil
Proceedings, enacted in 1876,11 Section 122 of the Code of Procedure
of 1848, was continued as Section 488, with a slight change in the
language of several of the subdivisions of the Section, and with at
least one new ground of Demurrer, to wit, "That the plaintiff demands
Judgment for two or more inconsistent kinds of relief." Section 490
of the Act of 1876,165 however, provided, in addition, that certain objections as enumerated in Section 488, as grounds of Demurrer, might
be sufficiently alleged if stated in the exact language of the statute,
or more specifically, subdivisions, first, second, fourth and ninth of
Section 488, which then listed ten grounds upon which a Demurrer
might be taken. Section 490 of the Act of 1876 is preserved in Section 280 of the present New York Civil Practice Act, 60 which, in
turn, was taken from Chapter 372, Section 280, by An Act to Amend
the Civil Practice Act of 1921.167
In the meantime, in 1920, the State Legislature enacted a stat164 Laws of New York (1876),
165 Ibid.

c. VI, § 488.

166 Laws of New York (1920), c. 925.
167 Laws of New York (1921), c. 372, § 280.

19571

THE DEMURRER

ute.68 abolishing the Demurrer, and substituted in lieu thereof the
modem motion. The statute provided:
§ 277. Demurrer Abolished; Objections to Pleadings; How
Taken.-The Demurrer is abolished. An objection to a pleading in
point of law, for a ground appearing on the face of the pleading, may
be taken by motion or by the answering pleading; except that objections, to be defined by the rules and relating to form and manner of
pleading, may be taken by motion only if the rules so provide.
Section 277 was amended the following year 6 9 to read:
§ 277. Demurrer Abolished; Objections to Pleadings; How
Taken.-The Demurrer is abolished. An objection to a pleading in
point of law may be taken by motion for judgment as the rules pro.
vide.
The "rules" referred to in Section 277 were New York Civil
Practice Rule 106, which authorized a motion for judgment on the
complaint, on the ground of a lack of jurisdiction over the defendant
or over the subject of the action, lack of plaintiff's capacity to sue,
pendency of another cause of action, or failure to state a good cause
of action; Civil Practice Rule 102, which authorized a motion to
correct a pleading where it was so indefinite, uncertain or obscure that
its precise meaning was not clear, covered grounds of Demurrer not
encompassed by Rule 106; Rule 109 governed plaintiff's motion
on the answer and Rule 111 controlled the motion on reply, while
Section 280 of the New York Civil Practice Act indicated how objections were to be stated.
On the recommendation of the Tenth Report of the New York
Judicial Council, 7 in 1944, these rules were revised, but Judge Clark
168 Laws of New York (1920), c. 925, § 277.
169 Laws of New York (1921), c. 372, § 277.
170 December 31, 1943, Supporting Studies, G. Recommended Amendments to the

Rules of Civil Practice, 305.

171 CASES oN CoDE PLEADiNG, c. VIII, § 86, 537, note 130 (2d ed., St. Paul 1947).

On the distinction between a motion to strike and a Demurrer, see Hanna v. Lichtenstein, 225 N. Y. 579, 12 N. E. 625 (1919), reviewed in 19 CoL. L. REV. 246 (1917).
That the New York Courts use the motion for judgment on the pleadings as a
substitute for the Demurrer, see New York Consol. R. Co. v. City of New York, 204
App. Div. 171, 197 N. Y. Supp. 387 (2d Dep't 1922); Kaluzer Young Men's Benev.
Soc. v. Independent Young Men's Sick Benev. Soc., 139 Misc. 391, 247 N. Y. Supp.
447 (1931), aff'd without opinion in 233 App. Div. 706, 249 N. Y. Supp. 930 (1st Dep't
1931); and article by Rothschild, The Simplification of Civil Practice in New York,
23 CoL. L. REv. 618, 641, 646, 752 (1923).
And on the motion for summary judgment in New York, see New York Civil Rule
112; see, also, Rules 107, 110, as amended in 1944. On the summary judgment rule
in the federal courts, see Federal Rule 56, subd. (c).
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observes, "the revisions while unfortunately retaining the old hierarchy of distinct, but merely slightly differing, motions, tend to freer
use of affidavits and other means of discovering the merits apart from
the formal pleadings."'' In practice, however, the situation has failed
to improve, as any realistic consideration of the cases indicates that
the courts are in effect merely using the motion for judgment, as
have the courts in New Jersey, the motion to strike, as a substitute
procedural device for the Demurrer. 7 2
(C) The English Objection in Law as a Substitute for the Demurrer.-Under the new English practice'7 3 the party objecting may
file an objection in point of law with his answer on the merits, but it
will not necessarily be disposed of prior to the trial. If, however, the
court feels that a decision on the point of law might dispose of the
case, he may rule on the objection in advance of the trial. 174 'According to Judge Clark, this authority to so dispose of the case, if need be,
operates "to restrict the objection in law, or Demurrer, to its primary
7
object and prevent its use for dilatory purposes.'M
(D) The Federal Solution of the Problem.-The new federal
system, 70 which provides for the abolition of the Demurrer and the
statement of all defenses in law or fact in the responsive /pleading, if
required, represents a compromise between the motion in lieu of the
Demurrer and the English objection in point of law, permitting the
objector a choice of procedure, that is, the objector might seek a ruling on his motion in advance of the trial, or a ruling might be postponed until the trial. In any event the objective of the federal court
has been to seek a new device for settlement of each case on the
merits, and without restriction to matter apparent on the face of the
pleading. The attainment of this objective has been obstructed, according to Judge Clark, by other provisions of the rules concerning
bills of particulars, preliminary motions on abateable matters, and
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, which
172 SmapmAN, HANDBOOK ON ComoN-LAW PLEADINo, C. 12, § 162, 294 (3d ed. by
Ballantine, St. Paul 1923), in respect to this situation, observes: "To abolish demurrers
entirely, while allowing the same objections in point of law to be raised under another
name, is as ludicrous a piece of self-deception as the old fictions in ejectment."
'73 English Rules of Supreme Court, Order 25, Rule 1-4, Ann. Practice, 444-446

(1945).
174 Robinson v. Fenner, [1913J 3 K. B. 835.
175 CLARK, HANDBOOK or m LAW or CODE PLEADING,

c. 8, § 86, 539 (2d ed.,
St. Paul 1947), where the advantages of the English objection in law as a substitute
for the Demurrer, is thoroughly treated.
176 Fed. Rule 7(c); Fed. Rule 12(b); Fed. Rule 12(d).
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made it possible for counsel to delay action. The struggle has centered around the word "state" as used in the third method of delay
mentioned above, and the use of affidavits going to the merits on
motions to dismiss or for judgment. If the formal pleadings were to
be accorded their traditional role, and the word "state" as used above,
was to be construed as usual, then when the objector desires to go
behind the pleadings, he should move for summary judgment under
Federal Rule 56, as was the design. But if the Demurrer is to be regarded as a weapon of delay, exalting form above substance, emphasis
upon the word "state" as a device for limiting the effective operation
of the federal rules, must be regarded as contrary to the spirit of the
new rules. The debate on the matter has become largely academic,
first, because the appellate courts have shown a tendency to follow the
liberal view, and second, because the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules has recommended that when matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court on a motion to
dismiss or on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the motion
1 77
shall be treated and disposed of as one for summary judgment.
Pending such change in the Federal Rules, what, one may well
ask, has been accomplished in the states by substituting the motion in
lieu of the Demurrer? At first glance, it may appear that this change
has been quite sweeping in its effect, whereas, in fact, it is more of a
change in form than in substance, because in order to determine the
scope of the substituted motion, it is necessary to understand the
scope of the Demurrer as it exists and operates at common law. Thus,
if it be asked, what kind of motions do we have, the answer is, the
same kind of mctions as we had Demurrers at common law, or general motions reaching substantive defects, and special motions reaching defects in form. If it is asked, what does a motion admit, the
answer. is, it admits substantially the same facts as were formerly
admitted by a Demurrer. That if the question is, what defects in
pleading may be reached by a motion, the reply is, the same, defects
which, at common law, were available upon General or Special Demurrer. If it is inquired, how far does a motion open up the record,
the answer is, back to the declaration or complaint, just as the Demurrer did; and finally, if it be asked, what exceptions are there to the
general rule as to the retrospective effect of the motion, the answer
177 See, SECOND PREL=ARY DRArr OF PRoPosED AmENDMENTS To RUEs OF CIV

PRoCmDuRE, Rule 12(b,c), (May, 1945).
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is, the same as at common law, in so far as those exceptions are susceptible of application to a code system of pleading which ordinarily
does not extend beyond the replication stage.
XV.

CONCLUSION-EFFECT OF REFORM SUMMARIZED

THUS appears, except for the change in nomenclature, or the
substitution of the name, "motion," in place of the name, "Demurrer,"
and except for the fact that a motion may come up for argument on
five days notice, whereas a Demurrer came up for argument on twenty
days notice, that no sufficient gain has been registered to justify the
change, with its resulting confusion and litigation, any more than
the earlier change of the original name, "exceptio" in favor of the
name, "Demurrer" had the effect of changing the nature of a primitive
Germanic procedural device by which a defendant might refuse to
answer on the ground of irrelevancy, or as stated in modern terms, on
the ground that the pleader has failed to state facts to which the substantive law attaches legal consequences. And to the extent that the
Federal Rules seek to have matter outside the pleadings considered on
Demurrer or gn motion, it is, strangely enough, harking back to the
primitive stage and Germanic origin of the Demurrer, when both
matters apparent on the face of the pleadings and dilatory matter,
or matter not on the face of the pleadings, might be considered in its
disposition.
If Judge Clark's suggestion as to the expansion of the motion,
so as to include both defects apparent and not apparent upon the
face of the pleadings, be not accepted, it will still remain true that the
substitution of the modern motion in lieu of the Demurrer has resulted
merely in a change in the name of an old procedural device from
that of Demurrer to Motion. 1 8
IT

178 On the futility of the substitution of the motion in lieu of the demurrer, PaopEssoR MjLLAR, in his recent work, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRAL COURT nr HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE, C. 13, Pleading, 188 (New York 1952), makes the following comment:
"The motion is made an outright substitute for the demurrer. The English Rules, remarked CE=rrc, J., 'could not have intended to abolish demurrers by the right hand
and restore them by the left'. But this is precisely what has been done in America. It
is no wonder that courts seeking to identify the instrumentality of objection are led
to speak of a 'motion to dismiss-or a motion to strike-in the nature of a demurrer.'
In these circumstances the socalled abolition of the demurrer means nothing but verbal
achievement. Why it should have been supposed that expulsion of the name, accompanied by retention of the thing, would betoken progress is difficult to* understand."

